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Recent Case Notes
CENSUS--POwER OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENSUS TO PUBLISH THE POPULA-
TION OF CITIES.-An interesting attempt to force the Director of Census
to lend his aid to the cause of competitive city advertising is to be found
in a recent case in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. In 1929 the
Georgia Legislature created the "municipality" of Atlanta, comprising an
area of approximately 184 square miles, of which the former city of Atlanta
was one borough. Although a semblance of central government was estab-
lished, the autonomy of the various boroughs was left practically uncur-
tailed. In a preliminary bulletin the Director of the Federal Census pub-
lished the population of Atlanta as 270,367, with a footnote describing the
Act of the Legislature and giving the total population of the municipality
as 360,692. The relators, including newspaper, hotel, and furniture cor-
porations, sought a writ of mandamus to compel the director to publish
the population of Atlanta as 360,692 in future bulletins. It was held that,
although the exercise by the legislature of its exclusive power and dis-
cretion to create municipalities is not to be questioned by the Director of
Census, mandamus would not lie for reason that the latter' had neither
power nor authority t6 publish the population of cities. United States ex.
rel. Atlanta v. Steuart, Director of Census, U. S. Daily, Oct. 28, 1930, at
2696 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1930).
It is well settled that mandamus will not issue to compel an officer to
carry out an act which he has no power or duty to perform.' But the ap-
plication of the rule to the instant case is doubtful. The Federal Constitu-
tion empowers Congress to provide for the decennial enumeration of the
people of the United States 2 and by the Census Act of 1902 the Director
of Census "is authorized and directed to have printed, published, and dis-
tributed, from time to time, bulletins and reports of the preliminary and
other results of the various investigations authorized by law," 3 and to col-
lect and publish "sdcial statistics of cities." 4 Although there have appar-
ently been no decisions interpreting the phrase "social statistics of cities,"
the authority and duty of the Director to publish preliminary bulletins has
been judicially construed to include the publication of statistics concerning
such political units as cities.5 And state legislatures, in providing for the
status of various political units, have relied on the duty of the Director to
publish such statistics.6 Likewise various courts have taken judicial notice
of such statistics as being prepared under provision of law.7 Furthermore a
IEx parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14 (1876) ; 2 BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS (1913)
781.
2Art. 1, § 2.
3 32 STAT. 53 (1902); 13 U. S. C. § 4 (1926).
4 32 STAT. 52 (1902) ; 13 U. S. C. § 111 (1926).
5 Childers v. Duvall, 69 Ark. 336, 340, 63 S. W. 802, 803 (1901) (inter-
preting section of Act of 1899 which was incorporated in the Act of 1902) ;
Holcomb v. Spikes, 232 S. W. 891, 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
6 State ex rel. Kilfiker v. Seaton, 191 Iowa 81, 181 N. W. 796 (1921);
Commonwealth ex rel Woodring v. Walter, 274 Pa. 553, 118 Atl. 510 (1922).
7 Brown v. Reeves, 129 Miss. 755, 92 So. 825 (1922); Stratton v. Oregon
City, 35 Ore. 409, 60 Pac. 905 (1900). But cf. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923)
§ 2577, n.4 (refers to 3 ibid, § 1671, where it is pointed out that the courts
usually confuse judicial notice with admission of evidence).
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liberal construction of the Census Act has been considered desirable by a
federal court for the reason that it is necessary to know something beyond
the fact that the population of each state reaches a certain limit s Thus
it would seem that the decision of the instant court that the Director was
neither authorized nor required to publish the population of cities is
difficult to justify. Yet the case achieves a desirable result in denying judi-
cial assistance to civic jealousy and negativing the possibility of states
vying with one another in creating weird types of municipalities in order
to place their cities a few notches higher on the Census List. But it is
thought that the same result could have been reached without disturbing
the status quo of the Census Director by dismissing the case on the ground
that mandamus issues only in cases of necessity to prevent injustice or
great injury.9 Furthermore, although the power of a state to define the
limits of a municipality for purposes of local government may be supreme,1 9
the court might well have decided that in the compilation of statistics
the Director of Census is invested with the discretion of defining the limits
of a municipality for the purpose of insuring some reasonable comparability
of the population of different cities.
CORPORATIONS-PRoPRIETY OF DEDUCTION OF CHARITABLE BEQUESTS ON
INCOimE TAx RETURNS.Three recent cases raise the timely question of the
propriety of deduction by a corporation of the amount of its charitable
contributions from its gross income in making income tax returns. In the
first the petitioner, a manufacturing company employing one half of the
city's wage earning population, contributed 36% of the total of a civic im-
provement fund. An order of the Board of Tax Appeals disallowing a
claim for a refund of the income tax paid by the petitioner on that con-
tribution was reversed, the court holding that such a contribution was de-
ductible from gross income as an "ordinary and necessary expense incurred
in carrying on trade or business" within the meaning of Section 2.34 (a)
(1) of the Revenue Act of 1918.1 Ameorican Rolling Mill Co. v. Conmmis-
sioner of Intenral Revenue, 41 F. (2d) 314 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930). In the
second of the cases the petitioner, a manufacturing company, made two
donations of $50,000 each to a trust fund established by it to aid its em-
ployees in time of emergency and illness, the trustees being given authority
to use the funds for any charitable or educational purpose which in their
judgment would benefit the petitioner's employees. An order of the Com-
sioner of Internal Revenue disallowing a claim under Section 234 (a) (1)
of the Revenue Act for a deduction of the contribution was reversed, even
though the trustees were authorized to spend the income of the trust for
objects which would not be deductible if made directly by the corporation.
Forbes Litlwgraphe Manufacturing Co. v. Widte, Collector of Internal
8 See United States v. loriarity, 106 Fed. 886, 891 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1901).
9 State, relation of McClellan v. Graves, 19 Md. 351 (1862) (opening
of street refused) ; State ex rel. Attorney General v. The Kansas City, St.
Joseph & Council Bluffs R. R., 77 Mlo. 143 (1882) (undoubted legal right
for trains to run refused in judicial discretion); HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL RuZ ms (3d ed. 1896) § 9. But cf. BAILEY, op. cit. supra note
1, at § 201.
10 Sharpleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646, 17 Sup. Ct. 957 (1897); Kirk-
patrick v. State, ex rel. McKee, 5 Kan. 673 (1868); 1 DILLoN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) § 66; 1 McQuILLIN, MUNxICIA CORrAmTIojns
(2d ed. 1928) § 182.
140 STAT. 1077 (1918).
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Revenue, 42 F. (2d) 287 (D. Mass. 1930). In the third of these decisions,
the petitioning corporation, in order to preserve the "good will" of its cus-
tomers, and at their solicitation, made various contributions to local funds
anct organizations. The Board of Tax Appeals held that 6uch contributions
were deductible from the petitioner's taxable income as necessary expendi-
tures. Killian Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 20 B. T. A. C. C.
H. Vol. III (1930) § 7537, C. C. H. Vol. II (1930) § 5697.
Where the employees of a corporation represent a large proportion of
those likely to be benefited by the corporation's donations to churches, hos-
pitals and other organizations, such donations are deductible as necessary
expenditures.2 Likewise if corporate contributions are made to benefit
projects which may usually be expected to stimulate the business of the
donor and bear a sufficiently direct relation to that business, they'are also
deductible. 3 In the instant cases the foregoing requirements were viewed
with considerable liberality. 4 Balancing the outlay against the benefits
2 Superior Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Com., 7 B. T. A. 380 (1927) (75% to
90% of congregation of donee church were employees of donor); Appeal
of Poinsett Mills, 1 B. T. A. 6 (1924). Cf. E. M. Holt Plaid Mills Inc. v.
Com., 9 B. T. A. 1360 (1927) (not deductible where petitioner's employees
represented only 25% of congregation of donee church); Boucher-Cort-
right Coal v. Com., 7 B. T. A. 1 (1927). But of. Corning Glass Works v.
Lucas, 37 F. (2d) 798 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1929) (hospital contribution de-
ductible although employees only 15% of town's population).
3 Appeal of Anniston City Land Co., 2 B. T. A. 526 (1925) (real estate
company contributed to fund for purchase of land for army camp); Mer-
chants Transfer & Storage Co. v. Com., 17 B. T. A. 290 (1929) (contribu-
tion by baggage transfer company to Shriner's convention fund). But of.
Majors Co. v. Com., 5 B. T. A.. 260 (1926) (contribution by bookstore
serving donee university not deductible because "not made in connection
with the operation of taxpayer's trade"); Appeal of Thomas Shoe Co., 1
B. T. A. 124 (1924) (donation by wholesale shoe company to purchase land
for naval ordnance plant non-deductible). The relationship between the
contribution and the donor's business is not of necessity considered to be
direct simply because a benefit is derived. See Appeal of Bell-Rogers &
Zemurray Co., 4 B. T. A. 687 (1926) (contribution by wholesale fruit com-
pany to purchase land for army camp held not deductible even though busi-
ness was increased fourfold); Anniston Auto Co. v. Com., 4 B. T. A. 689
(1926).
4 In' the Forbes case the company contributed to the neighborhood Y. M.
C. A. Cf. Appeal of Corso Paper Co., 3 B. T. A. 28 (1925) (contribution
to build a hospital, the city having no modern hospital at all, not deduct-
ible). In the American Rolling Mills case contributions were made to the
Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Public Library, Girls Club, Community Building
and American Legion. Cf. E. M. Holt Plaid Mills Inc. v. Com., supra note
2 (donations to Boy Scouts and Red Cross not deductible) ; Fire Companies
Building Corporation v. Com., 18 B. T. A. 1258 (1930) (even though em-
ployees of petitioner were always sent to donee hospital, petitioner's con-
tribution, without which hospital could not carry on, was held not deduct-
ible); Appeal of David Baird & Sons, 2 B. T. A. 901 (1925) (contributions
to highway fund to repair roads used by donor's employees not deductible).
In the Killian case contributions were made to Coe College, to funds to
bring conventions to Cedar Rapids, to church, social, literary and musical
organizations. Cf. Stephens Fuel Co. vi Com., 13 B. T. A. 666 (1928)
(contributions to various organizations at request of customers to retain
good will disallowed) ; Majors Co. v. Corn., supra note 3.
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reasonably to be expected, the courts were satisfied that the business inter-
ests of the donors would be advanced and that sufficed. The only reason for
limiting a corporation's freedom from taxation on its donations more
strictly than that of an individual is to effectuate a restraint upon such
corporations as might give away the corporate funds to the detriment of
stockholders.! Accordingly, if a donation does not violate the rights of the
stockholders by exceeding the powers of the corporation to use its funds for
purposes outside the usual course of business, it should be held deductible.
The cases indicate that in the absence of express charter limitations a cor-
poration possesses the power to use its funds for semi-eleemosynary pur-
poses if a benefit is reasonably to be expected from such use.0 It seems
clear that the liberal results reached in the instant cases are consistent
with the .purposes of the law in question and in line with the allowance
to corporations of broad incidental powers.
EVIDENCE-EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEASAY uLE IN PROVING DISPUTED
BOuINDARY.-In an action against the town to quiet title to a certain strip
of beach the defense offered the testimony of one Henry Sherwood in sup-
port of its contention that the disputed premises were public lands. The
witness was asked, "Have you ever talked with any other aged men, now
dead, or have you heard any other aged men make any statements con-
cerning the general reputation as to the particular beach that I have just
described to you?" He replied that when disputes had arisen as to public
rights in various pieces of property in the neighborhood his father and
grandfather used to say, "Well, there are two places where we will never
be barred out; one is Cedar Point and the other is Compo Mill Beach."
Laurence Donahue, als6 a witness for the defense, testified that one Aaron
Sherwood, previously deceased, who had lived near the disputed property
all his life had pointed out to him the boundary claimed by the defendant
and told him that that was the boundary line. On appeal it was held,
inter aiia, that the court did not err in admitting the testimony of the wit-
ness Henry Sherwood, as both question and answer properly reflected the
principle upon which reputation evidence is admissible. Donahue's testi-
mony was likewise held admissible on the ground that the difficulty of
proving private boundaries furnishes the indispensable and urgent necessity
for the admission of declarations of the deceased in respect to them. Bor-
den v. Town of Westport, 151 Atl. 512 (Conn. 1930).
In the United States the reported statements of deceased persons are
admissible as evidence of reputation in both public and private boundary
disputes.' The declaration must purport to be a statement of the com-
See Corning Glass Works v. Lucas, supra note 2, at 800.
a Richelieu Hotel Co. v. International Encampment Co., 140 111. 248, 29
N. E. 1044 (1892) (contribution by a hotel company to aid in establishing
nearby encampment); Huntington Brewing Co. v. MacGrew, 64 Ind. App.
273, 112 N. E. 534 (1916) (contribution by brewing company to organiza-
tion engaged in promoting the growth of commerce and industry in city);
Temple St. Cable Reg. Co. v. Hellman, 103 Cal. 634, 37 Pac. 530 (1894)
(traction company gave note to induce establishment of baseball park near
lines); Steinway v. Steinway, 17 Misc. 43, 40 N. Y. Supp. '18 (Sup. Ct.,
1896) (funds given for churches, library, streets and sewers by a corpora-
tion) ; People ex rel. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 130 App. Div.
150, 120 N. Y. S. 649 (3d Dep't 1909) (maintenance by insurance company
of hospital for care of employees).
1 For a general discussion of reputation evidence, see 3 WIGNIson, Evi-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1582ff.
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munity reputation of which the speaker is merely the mouthpiece; 2 and
statements which are merely individual assertion are rejected.8 Although
the declarations reported in the testimony of Henry Sherwood are labelled
evidence of reputation by the court, actually they seem no more than asser-
tions of fact. The question then arises whether these declarations are ad-
missible, as was the statement reported by the witness Donahue, under
another exception to the hearsay rule whereby, in many American juris-
dictions, certain individual assertions of the deceased may be received in
evidence in private boundary disputes.4 The admission of the declarations
under this exception, however, is doubtful, since in such cases courts require
that the declarant shall have had peculiar means of knowledge of the mat-
ter in controversy and no motive to misrepresent.5 So, the reported declara-
tion of one who surveyed the land,( a chain carrier in the survey, and one
who owned adjoining land have been admitted. The Massachusetts rule
goes so far as to require that the declarant must have been an owner of the
property and on the land engaged in pointing out the boundary when the
statement was made, although most jurisdictions exclude an owner's state-
ment as self-serving.9 No case ruling directly upon the question of knowl-
edge appears to have gone as far as the present one admitting the reported
declaration of a declarant who lived "very near" the disputed property.
Illustrative in both its holdings of a modern tendency to break down the
dividing lines of the orthodox exceptions to the hearsay rule,10 the prin-
cipal case may even represent an approach to the position advocated by
Wigmore that all declarations of deceased persons be admitted in evidence, 1
INTERNAL REVENUE--JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT CoURTSor APPEALS TO RE-
VIEW SPECIAL ASSESSMENT RULINGS OF THE BOARD OF TAX APPEALS AND
THE CO1IMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.-The petitioner claimed that it
was entitled to a special assessment under Sections 327 and 328 of the Rev-
enue Act of 1918 [40 STAT. 1057, 1093] which empowered the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to impose a tax bearing the same ratio to the net
income of the taxpayer as the average tax of representative corporations
bears to their net incomes when "unable to determine the invested capital"
and upon a finding that unless so assessed the tax would work "an excep-
tional hardship." The Commissioner's denial of such a claim by the peti-
2 Regina v. Bliss, 7 A. & E. 550 (1837). See Moseley v. Davies, 11 Price
162, 180 (1822).
3Attorney General v. Homer, [1913] 2 Ch. 140 (a map by a private in-
dividual does not of itself purport to be a statement of reputation) ; Brockle-
bank v. Thompson, [1903] 2 Ch. 344 (written statement of plaintiff's pre-
decessor in title); Regina v. Bliss, supra note 2 (oral statement of de-
ceased). But of. Wooster v. Butler, 13 Conn. 309 (1839); Deacle v. Han-
cock, 13 Price 226 (1824). See Den ex dem. Tasser v. Herring, 14 N. C.
340, 342 (1832).
4 See WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1562ff.
5 Turgeon v. Woodward, 83 Conn. 537, 78 At]. 577 (1910); cf. Matthews
v. Thatcher, 33 Tex. Civ. App. 133, 76 S. W. 61 (1903) ; Hadley v. Howe, 46
Vt. 142 (1873).
6 Sullivan v. Blount, 165 N. C. 7, 80 S. E. 892 (1914).
7 Ibid. See Harriman v. Brown, 8 Leigh 697, 713 (Va. 1837).
s Turgeon v. Woodward, supra note 5.
9 See WIGMIORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 1567.
10 McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 489.
"11 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 8a. The same view is held by
McCormick, op. cit, supra note 10, at 504.
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tioner was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals, and on appeal to the
Circuit Court of Appeals the jurisdiction of that court was challenged by
the Commissioner. The court held, inter alia, that the Revenue Act of 1926
[44 STAT. 109, 110 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1224 (1928)] had conferred upon
it jurisdiction to review any decision of the Board. Ryan Car Co. v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, U. S. Daily, Nov. 3, 1930, at 2697 (C. C. A.
7th).
Where there is an asserted deficiency upon which an application for a
special assessment is based,1 the Commissioner's action in allowing or
denying2 such application is subject to judicial 3 review by the Board of
Tax Appeals.4 By the Revenue Act of 1926 power "to affirm . . . modify
or reverse the decision of the Board" is vested in the Circuit Courts of
Appeals.&5 Thus there is a logical basis for the court's contention in the
instant case that it had jurisdiction to review a decision of the Board sus-
taining the Commissioner's denial of the petitioner's right to a special
assessment. But in Williampart Wire Rope Co. v. United States 0 the
Supreme Court held that in a suit for a refund1 based upon a claim of
special assessment the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction to review the
Commissioners' decision for the reason that such a decision was an act of
administrative discretion which, in the absence of fraud or other illegality,
could not be challenged in the courts. While that action was instituted prior
to the passage of the Act of 1926,8 the finality of the Commissioner's dis-
cretionary decision has been uniformly upheld in original suits for refund 9
and, in two circuits,1O on appeal from the Board. And the reasoning which
I A deficiency finding is a condition precedent to a review by the Board.
43 STAT. 297- (1924), 26 U. S. C. § 1048 (1928); Appeal of New York Trust
Co., 3 B. T. A. 583 (1926); Hudson-Dugger Co. v. Com., 7 B. T A. 357
(1927). A proposed statute has been drafted by the American Bar Asso-
ciation which would give the Board jurisdiction to review the Commission-
er's denial of special assessment irrespective of whether a deficiency is in-
volved. (1930) 8 N. L T. Al. 337, 378. A bill to the same effect has been in-
troduced in Congress. Sen. Bill No. 4268; H. R. 12237.
2 If the tax is assessed under Sections 327 and 328, the amount computed
by the Commissioner is evidently also 'subject to review. See principal
c ase.
3 See Kahn, The Status of the United States Board of Tax Appeals as a
Judicial Body (1929) 7 N. L T. M. 135.
4 Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U. S. 220, 48 Sup. Ct. 87 (1927).
5 f, Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com., 279 U. S. 716, 49 Sup. Ct. 499 (1929).
S The Judicial Status of the Board of Tax Appeals (1929) 7 N. L T. M.
175.
427T U. S. 551. 48 Sup. Ct. 587 (1928).
7 The Board of Tax Appeals is without jurisdiction to pass upon a mere
claim for refund. 45 STAT. 852 (1928), 26 U. S. C. § 2272 (1928); Everett
- Knitting Works, 1 B. T. A. 5 (1924); BICKFORD, COURT PrcEnuRE IN FED-
i~AL TAx CASFs (1928) 11. A statute which would give the Board juris-
:.9 diction was approved by the American Bar Association at its 53rd annual
meeting in August, 1930.
SNo'reference to this At was made in the instant ease.
9 Live Stock National Bank v. United States, 36 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A.
th, 1929), certiorari denied, 281 U. S. 760, 50 Sup. Ct. 459; Ennis Coal
Co. v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930) ; Brown's "Sham-
'rock"' Lizens v. Bowers, 41 F. (2d) 862 (S. D. N. Y. 1930); Chicago Frog
& S4vitch Co. v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 662 (1929).
-10 Cramer & King Co. v. Com., 41 (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Duquesne
1931]
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induced the Supreme Court in the Williamsport case to conclude that the
Court of Claims was without jurisdiction to review the decision of the Com-
missioner would seem to apply to the instant case to limit the scope of
appellate inquiries. For the Board, like the Commissioner, is exercising a
discretionary" authority and acts not as a court but as an administrative
agency.' 2 From a practical point of view, it is specially qualified by ex-
perience and knowledge to pass upon the technical and complex problems
necessarily incident to a just determination of special assessment rights.
By the intervention of such an intermediate agency, to confer the power
of scrutinizing judicially actions otherwise unreviewable in the courts is
to create an unwarranted distinction between original and appellate pro
ceedings. 12. Moreover, since the Circuit Court of Appeals is limited in its
review to the correction of errors of law 14 and since the reasons influenc-
ing the decision of the Board and the Commissioner 15 under the indefinite
determinatives prescribed by the Act of 1918 preclude an adequate exam-
ination by a court lacking the specialized skill of the Board of Tax Appeals,
the decision in the instant case seems particularly unwise.0
PRACTICE OF LAW-DOCUMENTS DRAWN BY TRUsT ComPANms.-The
Board of Bar Commissioners of Idaho instituted proceedings for an order
requiring the defendant trust company and its president to show cause
why the company should not be cited for contempt of court in practising
and holding itself out as qualified to practice law. The trust company had
issued pamphlets advertising itself as a "specialist in drawing trust agree-
ments, declarations of trust and wills," and calendars declaring that it
made a "speciality of drawing contracts, deeds and mortgages." The Idaho
statutes made the practice of law or representation of legal qualifications
without a license an offense punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. It
was held that the defendant trust company, in representating itself as
qualified to perform the above acts, was practising law in violation of the
statutory requirements. In re Idaho Trust Co., 288 Pac. 157 (Idaho 1930).
While it has been consistently held that a corporation cannot practice
Steel Foundry Co. v. Com., 41 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) (order deny-
ing certiorari vacated and rehearing granted. Nov. 24, 1930) ; Apollo Steel
Co. v. Com., 41 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Standard Rice Co. v. Com.,
41 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). Only in the last case was considera-
tion given the Act of 1926. Cf. Oak Worsted Mills Co. v. United States,
38 F. (2d) 699 (Ct. Cl. 1930), certiorari granted, 281 U. S. 717, 50 Sup.
Ct. 465.
1 Standard Rice Co. v. Com., supra note 10.
1244 STAT. 105 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 1211 (1928); Old Colony Trust Co.
v. Com., supra note 5, at 725, 49 Sup. Ct. at 502.
13 Cf. Standard Rice Co. v. Com., supra note 10; James, Special Assess-
ment Cases in the Courts and in the Board (1930) 8 N. L T. M. 287.
24 Avery v. Com., 22 F. (2d) 6 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) ; Bishoff v. Com., 27
F. (2d) 91 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928); Powers Mfg. Co. v. Coin., 34 F. (2d) 255
(C. A. A. 8th, 1929); Anchor Co. Inc. v. Com., 42 F. (2d) 99 (C. C, A.
4th, 1930).
15 Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, supra note 6, at 556, 48
Sup. Ct. at 589. See MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1929) 301.
10 Cf. Standard Rice Co. v. Com., mspra note 10; Magill, Finality of Do-




law,1 an adequate definition of the "practice of law" has not been ad-
vanced.2 The concept certainly includes more than appearance before a
court of record, 3 or the conduct of litigation.4 According to the definition
framed by the United States Supreme Court the practice of law embraces
all activity relating to "legal formalities." But the decisions enumerating
legal formalities present a "wilderness of single instances." Thus, while
negotiations with a magistrate for the release of a prisoner have been held
to constitute the practice of law,7 proceedings taken before a state legis-
lature to secure a pardon have been otherwise interpretedVs And a com-
pany which had drawn up a bill of sale was acquitted by the New York
Court of Appeals, 9 although at the same term that court ruled that the draw-
ing of bills of sale was practicing law.'0 The question as to what constitutes
the practice of law has been a constantly recurring one as the profits" to
be secured by acting as trustee have led more and more modern trust com-
panies to engage in activif-s commonly performed by lawyers.'2 More-
over the advertisements employed by many trust companies are apt to mis-
lead laymen even if they do not strictly make representations of legal
ability.'3 A legalistic solution of the problem, however, has proven in-
effectual except in extreme cases. 14 Consequently, trust officers and law-
yers have attempted to separate their respective functions in mutual confer-
ences. 15 Committees in state bar associations have also directed their at-
I Matter of Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910);
Matter of City of New York, 144 App. Div. 107, 128 N. Y. Supp. 999 (1st
Dep't 1911).
2 See E. J. McCULLEN, REPORT TO THE ST. Louis BAR Ass'N (Feb. 4,
192 ).
-3 Commonwealth v. Barton, 20 Pa. Super. 447 (1902).
4 In re Duncan, 83 S. C. 186, 65 S. E. 210 (1909).
5 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 199 (1879).
6 Jackson, Functions of The Trust Conpany in the Field of Law (1929)
52 N. Y. BAR ASS'N REP. 142; THORNrON, ATTORNEYS AT LiW (1914) § 69.
In re Duncan, supra note 4.
Bird v. Breedlove, 24 Ga. 623 (1858) ; cf. State v. Bryan, 98 N. C. 644,
4 S. E. 522 (1887).
9 People v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N. Y. 360, 125 N. E. 660
(1919). The case turns, perhaps, on the construction of the word "prac-
tice" since the defendant company was accused of infrequent acts. That
the word "practice" includes more than a single effort, see McCargo v.
State, 1 So. 161 (Miss. 1887).
10 People v. Alfani, 227 N. Y. 334, 125 N. E. 671 (1919).
1 See Committee Report on the Scope and Practice of Law (1930) 53
N. Y. BAR Ass'N REP. 432; Griswold, Trust Service and "Practice of Law"
(1929) 48 TgusT CoMPANmis 753.
'2Note (1920) 68 U. of PA. L. REV. 356.
"3 YEAR BOOK, N. Y. COUNTY LAwYER's AsS'N (1924) 167.
14 Thus the investment of funds is a legitimate bank or trust function,
Commonwealth v. Barton, supra note 3, while the drafting of wills and
papers of incorporation falls within the lawyer's province, Eley v. Miller,
7 Md. App. 529, 34 N. E. 836 (1893). It would seem, also, that if the docu-
ment is standardized or the act consists only of filling in blanks a layman
might perform the service and therefore a company also. See instant case
at 158; Note (1918) 31 HLARV. L. REv. 886.




tention to the problem.1 6 In view of the past success of mutual conferences
and the willingness of the parties to pursue this program in the future,
the conference method appears to be the most satisfactory one for separat-
ing the legal and business aspects of the trust transaction,17 and the instant
decision, while of considerable present interest, appears merely to add one
more "instance" to the "wilderness of single instances."
PROCEDURE-BURDEN OF PROVING CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE IN "HIT-
AND-RUN" ACCmENTS.-The plaintiff's decedent, traversing a crosswalk, was
struck and killed by a car negligently driven by the defendant, who im-
mediately drove away from the scene of the accident. There were no eye-
witnesses and the defendant failed to testify. In an action for damages
for wrongful death, the defendant's motion for a nonsuit was granted for
lack of direct evidence of due care on the part of the decedent. On appeal,
the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, although deploring the absence
of a "statutory provision ... to enforce the obviously just requirement that
the burden of proof in this particular class of cases be put in effect upon
the defendant," went on record as bound to follow the established Connecti-
cut rule as to the burden of proof, and hence forced to affirm the lower
court decision (Chief Justice Wheeler dissenting). Kotler v. Lalley, 151
Atl. 433 (Conn. 1930).
The incidence of the burden of proof is generally deemed to be a matter
of procedural law.1 . Rules of procedutal law, when found to work injustice,
have frequently been reversed,2 and the consequent departure from prece-
dent has not been considered an interference with any constitutional right.8
More particularly, several courts have felt free to reverse, of their own
motion, rules governing the burden of proof on the issue of contributory
negligence. 4 Furthermore, although authority exists to the effect that the
16 The Committee on the Unlawful Practice of the Law, of the N. Y.
County Lawyer's Association, and the Committee on Illegal Practice of Law
by Laymen, of the Missouri Bar Association, are examples.
17 Cf. The Practice of Law by Banking Institutions (1930) 47 BANKING
L. J. 819; Trite Observations on Relationship between Thust Companies
and the Legal Profession (1929) 48 TRUST COMPANIES 235. But of. Daw-
son, Frankenstein, Inc. (Mar. 1930) 19 Am. MERCURY 274.
1 Cf. Southern Indiana R.R. v. Peyton, 157 Ind. 690, 61 N. E. 722 (1901)
(retroactive statutes changing burden of proof held constitutional); Sack-
heim v. Pigueron, 215 N. Y. 62, 109 N. E. 109 (1915) (same); Dug-
gan v. Bay State Ry., 230 Mass. 370, 119 N. E. 757 (1918); Schrader v.
New York, C., & St. L. R.R., 172 N. E. 272 (N. Y. 1930); 2 WHARTON,
CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) 1107. See MeKean, The Rule of Preced-
ents (1928) 76 U. of PA. L. REv. 481, 487; Note (1915) 29 HARV. L. RE. 95.
2 Perry v. Haritos, 100 Conn. 476, 124 Atl. 44 (1924) (admissibility of
evidence); Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 165 Pa. 162, 30 Atl. 836
(1895) (default. judgments against corporations for misdemeanor); Rosen
v. United States, 245 U. S. 467, 38 Sup. Ct. 148 (1918) (competency of
witness); Whitaker v. Lane, 128 Va. 317, 104 S. E. 252 (1920) (evidence
of conditional delivery of sealed instrument).
3 Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234
U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 941 (1914); Kenfield-Leach Co. v. Industrial Pub-
lications, 320 Ill. 449, 151 N. E. 239 (1926). Cf. Second Employers Liabil-
ity Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912); Arizona Copper Co. v.
Hammer, 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1919).
Adams v. Bunker Hill Mining Co., 12 Idaho 637, 89 Pac. 624 (1907);
Buechner v. City of New Orleans, 112 La. 599, 36 So. 603 (1904); Hoyt v.
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burden of proof is to be regarded as a substantive matter, substantive
rights may properly be altered by the overruling of prior decisions.0 The
rule here followed has been widely repudiated elsewhere by legislationT
or decisions Even a recognition that the procedural handicap, imposed on
the plaintiff by the burden of proof of due care, may be both just and
politic in the ordinary negligence action does not warrant a judicial exten-
sion of the rule to cover the distinctive factual situation presented by the
"hit-and-run" accident. The Connecticut court itself has accepted unex-
plained departure from the scene of an accident, in violation of statutory
duty,9 as evidence of a "consciousness of guilt." 21 And consciousness of
guilt or, correspondingly, of liability might well be said to indicate a lack
of defenses and thus to amount, in the instant case, to an implied admission
that the decedent had not been guilty of any negligence materially affecting
the defendant's liability. The instant decision, while allegedly based on
the reluctance of the court to alter an existing law, in effect ex\tends to the
hit-and-run killer the advantage of a rule heretofore applied only in ordi-
nary negligence actions and in favor of less reprehensible parties. Judicial
legislation of this sort is difficult to support, and obviously cannot be justi-
fied by the veiled reference in the opinion to the general impropriety of
judicial legislation.
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY-DEBTOa'S FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AS
LIMITING RIGHTS OF SuRETY.The plaintiff, payee of an unsecured promis-
sory note endorsed by him before maturity to a third party with a guarantee
of payment, brought a bill in equity against the defendant to set aside as
fraudulent certain conveyances made by the maker to the defendant. The
plaintiff alleged that the note was past due, that he was being pressed for
City of Hudson, 41 Wis. 105 (1876) ; of. City of Vicksburg v. Hennessy, 54
Miss. 391 (1877); Mississippi Central R.R. v. Hardy, 88 Bliss. 732, 41 So.
505 (1906).
5 The rule of burden of proof enforced by the federal courts is held so
far a substantive matter as to be applicable in a case tried before a fed-
eral court in a jurisdiction enforcing a different rule. Central Vermont
Ry. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865 (1915); cf. Lee v. Central of
Georgia Ry., 252 U. S. 109, 40 Sup. Ct. 254 (1920).
6 Reiter v. Grober, 173 Wis. 493, 181 N. W. 739 (1921) (doctrine of im-
puted negligence abandoned); Citizens Life Assurance Cb. v. Brown, [1904J
A. C. 423 (rule as to malicious intent in a corporation reversed); Ashland
Finance Co. v. Dudley, 98 W. Va. 255, 127 S. E. 33 (1925) (rule as to
priority of liens reversed); Adams Express Co. v. Beckwith, 100 Ohio St.
348, 126 N. E. 300 (1919) (rule as to effect of release of one of joint tort-
feasors reversed); Klein v. Blaravelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 114 N. E. 809 (1916)
(prior holding as to constitutionality of statute overruled).
7 N. Y. Civm PRAcTIcE ACT § 265; N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 328 § 13;
MASS. GEN. LAWS (1921) c. 231, § 85; ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 87, § 48;
IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 380.
s Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Landrigan, 191 U. S. 461, 24 Sup. Ct. 137
(1903) ; Aubin v. Duluth Street Ry., 169 linn. 342, 211 N. W. 580 (1926) ;
Casey v. Chicago Railway Co., 269 Ill. 386, 109 N. E. 984 (1915); Wilkins v.
Bradford, 247 Mich. 157, 225 N. W. 609 (1929); SHARAN AND REDFIELD,
NEGLIGENCE (6th' ed. 1913) §§ 107, 108; THoaIPSON, NEGLIGENCE (Supp.
1907, 1914). § 366.
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 1584(a).




payment, and that unless it were paid by the maker, he would have to pay
it. A lower court judgment for the plaintiff was reversed on appeal on the
ground that the bill was not one of exoneration to force payment by the
debtor or his estate, but was an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance
and that this latter action was available in Idaho only to judgment creditors.
Saunders v. Saunders, 291 Pac. 1069 (Idaho 1930).
That a surety, guarantor, indorser or accommodation maker of commer-
cial paper need not pay the debt of his principal in order to be discharged
from liability is settled law.' On maturity of the debt two courses are
open to such a party. He fiiay, in jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine
of Pain v. Packard,2 compel the creditor to sue the debtor, a failure to sue
within a reasonable time discharging the surety.3 Or, he may bring in
equity a bill of exoneration to force the debtor to pay.4 The instant case
involved the availability of this latter remedy when the debtor had con-
veyed away his assets and thereby insulated himself against attachments.
Many statutes require that a petitioner filing a bill to set aside allegedly
fraudulent conveyances must be a judgment creditor,0 while others require
only that he be a simple contract creditor.0 But a surety who has not paid
his principal's debt is not regarded as a creditor within either type of
statute,7 although a few special statutes permit a contingently liable
surety to file such a bill.8 The construction of the term "creditor" adopted
by the instant court forces a surety to pay the debt before bringing action
against a dishonest debtor. Thus a debtor may, by his fraudulent acts,
limit the rights of a hard-pressed surety. Though such a holding as that
in the principal case may be justifiable in legal theory, certain it is that
the surety is denied protection when he needs it most.
TAXATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-INcomtE FROM PATENTS AND COPY-
RIGHTS AS THE MEASURE OF A CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAx.-The federal in-
strumentality doctrine2 has recently received consideration and diverse
application in two cases involving the power of a state to include in its
calculation of the amount of a corporation franchise tax, income derived
through royalties from patents and copyrights. In the first case, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court held that the income of a corporation consisting of
12 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) § 1011; 1 BRANDT,
SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed. 1905) §§ 245, 246.
2 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816).
3 See Comment (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 971 and cases discussed therein.
4 Thorne v. St. Paul's M. E. Church, 86 Ala. 138, 5 So. 508 (1889); Hol-
combe v. Fetter, 70 N. J. Eq. 300, 67 Atl. 1078 (1905); Pavarini & Wyno
Inc. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 36 App. D. C. 348 (1911); Sassaman
v. Root, 37 Idaho 588, 218 Pac. 374 (1923). See also 1 STORY, op. cit. SUpnd
note 1, at § 571; Note (1910) 9 MICH. L. REv. 237.
5 Ellis v. Southwestern Land Co., 108 Wis. 313, 84 N. W. 417 (1900);
Perkins v. Bundy, 42 Idaho 560, 247 Pac. 751 (1926).
6 Greene v. Starnes, 48 Tenn. 582 (1870); Smith v. Pitts, 167 Ala. 461,
52 So. 402 (1910) ; Thuringer v. Trafton, 58 Colo. 250, 144 Pac. 866 (1914);
Price v. Engle, 77 Ind. App. 439, 133 N. E. 755 (1922).
7 Barnes v. Sammons, 128 Ind. 596, 27 N. E. 747 (1891) ; Severs v. Dod-
son, 53 N. J. Eq. 633, 34 Atl. 7 (1895); Ellis v. Southwestern Land Co.,
supra note 5; Smith v. Pitts, supra note 6. Contra: Stump v. Rogers, 1 Ohio
533 (1823).
8 Greene v. Starnes, supra note 6; Walters v. Akers, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 259,
101 S. W. 1179 (1907).
I See 2 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 606.
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royalties on patent rights was unconstitutionally included in the computa-
tion of a state corporate franchise tax. The court regarded the assessment
as on income rather than as an excise levied for the privilege of doing busi-
ness, and consequently, on the authority of Long 'v. Rockwood,2 affirmed the
decree of the chancellor awarding the complainant a recovery for the aggre-
gate of the taxes paid by it. Quicksafe Manufacturing Co. v. Graham, 29
S. W. (2d), 253 (Tenn. 1930). Opposed to this decision, is that of the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York in a very
similar case, where a corporation sought to enjoin the Attorney-General of
New York from collecting a franchise tax measured by its net income
which was derived solely from copyright royalties on motion picture films.
The bill was dismissed on the ground that the tax was not levied on income,
but was an excise tax, and that the income of the corporation, although de-
rived solely from copyrights, entered into the measure of the tax merely
as a casual incident thereof. Educational Filmns Corporation of America
v. Ward, 41 F. (2d) 395 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
The power which both Tennessee and New York here sought to exercise
is analogous to that under which states have heretofore computed excise
taxes on the basis of income derived from federal securities.3 The validity
of such a method of assessment under the federal instrumentality doctrine
was questioned, however, in Macallen Co. v. Malssachusctts,4 where it was
held that income from such securities could not be used as the measure of a
corporate franchise tax. The District Court in the Educational Films case
distinguished the Macallen case on the ground that there the resulting
charge against federal securities was not a mere casual incident of the tax
but a deliberate attempt of the legislature to reach such securities. Never-
theless, whatever the legislative intent may be, it seems clear that the in-
clusion of income from non-taxable securities in the measure of a corporate
franchise tax actually renders the securities somewhat less valuable to the
corporation. It has been suggested, however, that, even conceding this,
such indirect taxation places no appreciable burden upon the borrowing
power of the United States.0 The Tennessee court recognized the trans-
parency of the "excise" device, but in doing so lost sight of the major con-
sideration that the applicability of the federal instrumentality doctrine
should properly depend upon whether a failure to apply it would result in
any detriment to the government The District Court, on the other hand, by
2 277 U. S. 142, 48 Sup. Ct. 463 (1928) (state income tax on royalties
derived from patents held unconstitutional, as being a tax on a federal in-
strumentality). Cf. (1927) 26 MIcH. L. REv. 120. But ef. (1928) 28 COL.
L. Rav. 1100.
3 Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (U. S. 1867) ; Hamilton Co. v.
Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632 (U. S. 1867). See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U. S. 107, 163, 31 Sup. Ct. 342, 354 (1910).
4 279 U. S. 620, 49 Sup. Ct. 432 (1929). See Note (1930) 43 H]£nv. L.
REV. 280.
5 As first passed, the statute in the Macallen case expressly exempted
income from United States securities. MAsS. GEN. LAws (1921) c. 63, § 30,
par. 5, as amended by Mlass. Acts 1925, c. 265, § 1. A, further amendment
shortly thereafter omitting this exemption, the Supreme Court regarded it
as the manifestation of an intention to tax such securities. Mass. Acts
1925, c. 343, § 1A. Cf. Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 715, 47 Sup. Ct.
280 (1927). See (1930) 44 HAnV. L. Rav. 136.
C See Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing
Power of the States (1919) 32 HARv. L. REV. 902, 926.
' See 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 606.
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its inability to see the tax before it other than as an excise, reached a
much more reasonable decision, but likewise failed to note that the inclusion
of the income of a corporation within the terms of a state excise tax can
hardly be viewed as a discouragement of invention and authorship within
the contemplation of the ConstitutionAs
WORKMEN'S Co1DI'ENSATION-VoRK IN BROADCASTING STATION As INTER-
STATE EMPLOYIIENT.An employee of a radio broadcasting company was
engaged in the installation of an ice machine for the proper cooling of
radio tubes. While attempting to move the switchboard, an integral part
of the transmitting apparatus, he was electrocuted. An order of the lower
court denying an application for compensation under the State Workmen's
Compensation Act [WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) §§ 7673 et scq.]
-was affirmed on appeal, the court ruling that the employee had been per-
forming work so closely, related to interstate commerce as to be' a part of
it. Van Dusen v. Department of Labor and Industries, 290 Pac. 80 (Wash.
1930).
In the absence of federal legislation, the states ordinarily retain juris-
diction over industrial accidents in interstate commerce.' The Washington
Workmen's Compensation Act, however, specifically excludes from its pur-
view those employees "for whom a rule of liability or method of compensa-
tion is now existing under or may be established by the Congress of the
United States." 2 Consequently employees of that state engaged in both
interstate and intrastate,3 or wholly in interstate service, other than rail
transportation,4 are subjected to all the ancient common law defenses pecu-
liar to actions to recover for accidents occurring while at work.5 Thus the
question whether the special employment at the time of an injuiry was of an
8 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, art. 1, § 8. It might be argued, that if
the computation of a corporate franchise tax on the basis of income from
copyrights or patents would diminish corporate profits to the extent that
a corporation would pay an author or inventor less for the use of his works,
the pecuniary incentive of the latter to produce would be lessened, and
the purpose of this clause of the constitution defeated. But such a possi-
bility seems too remote to be reasonable. See (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 136;
(1930) 30 COL. L. Rsv. 1070.
1Valley Steamship Co. v. Wattawa, 244 U. S. 202, 37 Sup. Ct. 523
(1917); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Byrd, 155 Tenn. 455, 294 S. W.
1099 (1927). See Wagner v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 265 Ill. 245, 251, 106
N. E. 809, 812 (1914); DAVIS; AERONAUTICAL LAW (1930) 320.
2 WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 7695. For similar provisions
see KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) c. 44, § 506; MiCH. COMp. LAWS (Cahill,
1915) § 5491; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930) c. 66, § 113; W. VA. CODE
ANN. (Barnes, 1923) c. 15P, § 52.
3 The Michigan, New York, and West Virginia statutes, meiqna note 2,
provide for mutual election by employer and employee to comply with the
state compensation act in cases of employment partly interstate and partly
intrastate.
4 Only "common carriers by rail" are affected by the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U. S. C. §§
51-59 (1926).
5 State v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 101 Wash. 630, 172 Pac. 902, aff'd,
104 Wash. 693, 176 Pac. 346 (1918) ; Adams v. Kentucky & West Virginia
Power Co., 102 W. Va. 66, 135 S. E. 662 (1926). See Suttle v. Hope Na-
tural Gas Co., 82 W. Va. 729, 735, 97 S. E. 429, 432 (1918). But see Stoll
v. Pacific Coast S. S. Co., 205 Fed. 169 (S. D. Wash. 1913).
[Vol. 40
RECENT CASE NOTES
interstate or intrastate nature, always a question of degreeO here becomes
particularly significant. If the railroad cases, which draw a distinction be-
tween state and interstate activity on the basis of whether the work in-
volved construction or repair, are regarded as controlling, then the occupa-
tion in the instant case may logically be held to fall within the field of
interstate commerce.S It may be questioned, however, whether the railroad
cases, involving the movement of tangible objects between states, are de-
cisive of the wholly different situation presented by radio broadcasting,
wherein neither equipment nor service e-tend beyond state lines. The
necessity for federal control demanded the expansion of the concept of in-
terstate commerce to include broadcasting for purposes of regulation o but
that an industry, admittedly sui gentris, is interstate for one purpose would
not seem to compel its classification as interstate for all purposes.20 In
assuming to the contrary, the court in the instant case has, unnecessarily,
it is thought, precluded the application of the Compensation Act to a field
over -which, in view of the probable infrequency of radio accidents, the fed-
eral government will not likely see fit to legislate.
ZONING-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ZONING ORDINANCE RAISED IN CERTIOInI
PROCEEDINGs.-Under the provisions of the zoning ordinance of the city of
Chicago, the petitioners appealed to the board of zoning appeals from a de-
cision of the building commissioner granting the appellants a permit to
erect a sLx-ty-story office building. The board of appeals affirmed the com-
missioner's decision, and the petitioner then sued out a -writ of ccrtiorari
to the circuit court, following the procedure provided by the ordinance.
The trial court, in revoking the permit, upheld the petitioner's contention
that the amendment to the zoning ordinance, under the authority of which
the appellants had originally applied for the permit, was unconstitutional.
On appeal, the appellants asserted that under a writ of ccrtiorari the peti-
tioner could not raise, nor had the court the power to pass upon, the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance. The Supreme Court of Illinois held (Dun-
e See Industrial Accident Comm. v. Davis, 259 U. S. 182, 187, 42 Sup. Ct.
489, 491 (1922).
Compare the following analogous cases. Held interstate: Southern Paci-
fic Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 178 Cal. 20, 171 Pac. 1071 (1918) (re-
pairing conduit from power plant to trolley wire); Ross v. Sheldon, 176
Iowa 618, 154 N. W. 499 (1915) ("replacing" hand signals by automatic
system); Thompson v. Cincinnati N. 0. & T. P. Ry., 165 Ky. 256, 176 S. W.
1006( -work on repair shop extension); Vollmers v. New York Central 1R.1.,
180 App. Div. 60, 167 N. Y. Supp. 426 (3d Dep't 1917) (repairing plumb-
ing in interstate depot). Held intrastate: Wright v. Interurban Ry., 189
Iowa 1315, 179 N., W. 877 (1920) (dismantling and reconstructing sub-
station); Seaver v. Payne, 198 App. Div. 423, 190 N. Y. Supp. "724 (3d
Dep't 1921) ("replacing" turntable).
s For the various tests devised by the courts see Pedersen v. Delaware,
L. & W. R.R., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648 (1913); Lamphere v. Oregon
1R1.. & Navigation Co., 196 Fed. 336 (C C. A 9th, 1912); Southern Pacific
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., supra note 7; Note (1927) 22 ILM. L.
REv. 209. But see Note (1930) 1 Am L. RIv. 491.
9 See United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448
(E. D. Ill. 1929); Comment (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 245; (1929) 14 MINN. L.
REv. 176.
20 Cf. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Byrd, supra note 1 (telegraph,
though a common carrier for regulatory purposes, held not "common carrier"
according to meaning of Compensation Act).
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can, J., dissenting) that the issue of constitutionality was properly before
the court in certiorari proceedings. Michigan-Lake Building Corp. v. Ham-
ilton, 172 N. E. 710 (Ill. 1930).
"Most zoning ordinances provide that any person aggrieved by the decision
of a local zoning board may petition a court of record to review the decision
of the board on a writ of certiorari.1 Upon the hearing the court may take
evidence and may reverse, affirm or modify, wholly or in part, the decision
brought up for review. 2 Attempted determination of the proper scope of
the judicial review so provided has given rise to much confusion. At com-
mon law the writ of certiorari was used only to review the decisions of
inferior courts and administrative bodies on jurisdictional questions, 3 and
the reviewing court, confined to the record, was not permitted to take evi-
dence or reopen questions of fact.4 Hence it is clear that the writ of cer-
tiorari authorized by zoning ordinances is a special statutory writ and
the proceedings in respect to it should therefore be controlled by the creat-
ing statute.5 Some courts, in construing such statutes, have denied them-
selves the power to pass upon the question of constitutionality under the
specially prescribed certiorari proceeding, contending that the issue can
only be raised in some other manner, such as by a suit for a mandamus,
an injunction, or a declaratory judgment.6 One court, in so holding, de-
clared that since review by certiorari is predicated upon the constitutional-
ity of the ordinance, a petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage
of that method of review in order to attack the validity of the ordinance.,
This interpretation bears out the intention of the framers of the Standard
,Zoning Act that too frequent raising of the constitutionality issue be pre-
cluded by provision for a special means of relief in cases of hardship.0
Cf. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (Dep't of Comm. 1926) 11,
which is followed in whole or in part by practically every state that has
enacted a zoning statute. See BAKER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING (1927)
39, 43.
2STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (Dep't of Comm. 1926) 13.
3 Cf. N. Y. Central R.R. v. Middlesex County, 220 Mass. 569, 108 N. E.
506 (1915); In re Washington Party Nominations, 237 Pa. 567, 85 Atl.
873 (1912).
4 Cass v. Duncan, 260 Ill. 228, 103 N. E. 280 (1913) ; State v. Sundquist,
137 Wis. 292, 118 N. W. 836 (1908).
5 Cf. In re Forbes, 316 Ill. 141, 146 N. E. 448 (1925).
6 In New York the courts have uniformly held that mandamus is the
proper proceeding to test the validity of a zoning ordinance. Matter of
Dillon v. O'Shaughnessy, 222 App. Div. 772, 226 N. Y. Supp. 37 (2d Dep't
1927) ; Matter of Melita v. Nolan, 126 Misc. 345, 213 N. Y. Supp. 674 (Sup.
Ct. 1926); Hecht-Dann v. Burden, 124 Misc. 632, 20& N. Y. Supp. 299
(Sup. Ct. 1924). Similarly in New Jersey. Falco v. Kaltenbach, 3 N. J.
Misc. 333, 128 Atl. 394 (1925) ; Rohrs v. Zabriskie, 102 N. J. L. 473, 133 Atl.
65 (1926). Cf. State v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) (injunc-
tion); Taylor v. Haverford Township, 299 Pa. 402, 149 At]. 639 (1930)
(declaratory judgment); (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1220.
Taylor v. Haverford Township, supra note 6 at 408, 149 Atl. at 641.
Cf. Pera v. Village of Shorewood, 176 Wis. 261, 186 N. W. 623 (1922)
(petitioner filing claim for compensation pursuant to eminent domain zoning
statute not allowed to attack validity of statute on appeal); Appeal of
Holley, 110 Conn. 80, 147 Atl. 300 (1929) (applicant for permit to erect
gas station not permitted on appeal to raise constitutionality of statute
providing method of appeal).
s BASSETT, BOARD OF APPEALS IN ZONING (1921) 6.
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On the other hand, in Illinois 9 and a few other states10 the zoning statutes
have been so interpreted that courts are permitted to pass upon constitu-
tionality under the special certiorari proceeding. These courts construe
the statute as widening the field of review to include not only questions of
jurisdiction but also questions of fact, thereby creating a liberality of
review which is a departure from that allowed to administrative boards in
common law proceedings on certiorarLll The result under this line of de-
cisions is in accord with the general policy of allowing fewer artificial
limitations on the scope of judicial review. ' Divergence in interpretation
of the same statutory provision can here be attributed to the statutory use
of the term certiorari to designate the special procedure for reviewing zon-
ing cases, for the door is thereby opened to irrelevant analogies. Under
this conflict of statutory construction, the instant case emphasizes the nec-
essity of a choice between what is conceived to be the policy behind the
zoning statute and the broader interests of simplified procedure.
9 Minkus Pond, 326 Ill. 467, 158 N. E. 121 (1927); Brown v. Board of
Appeals, 327 Ill. 644, 159 N. E. 225 (1927).
L0 Ayers v. Building Commissioner, 242 Mass. 30, 136 N. E. 338 (1922);
Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 321 N. W. 354 (1928); Sundlun v. Zon-
ing Board of Review, 50 R. 1. 108, 145 Atl. 451 (1929).
- See Hughes v. Board of Appeals, 325 Ill. 109, 113, 156 N. E. 350, 351
(1927); Park Ridge Fuel Co. v. City of Park Ridge, 335 fI1. 509, 515, 1T
N. E. 119, 122 (1929).
- See Dodd, Problems of Appellate Courts (1929) HANDBOOK OF AN=ERI-
-CAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS 72, 84; Sunderland, ibid., 88, 90; Sun-
derland, Problem of Appellate Review (1926) 5 TMu. L. REv. 126, 138.
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